Anticipation and the Non-linear Dynamics of Meaning-Processing in Social
  Systems by Leydesdorff, Loet
Anticipation and the Non-linear Dynamics of  
Meaning-Processing in Social Systems 
Paper to be presented at the World Congress of Sociology, Durban, July 2006 
 
Loet Leydesdorff 
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), University of Amsterdam,  
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX  Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
loet@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net  
 
Abstract 
Social order does not exist as a stable phenomenon, but can be considered as “an 
order of reproduced expectations.” When anticipations operate upon one another, they 
can generate a non-linear dynamics which processes meaning. Although specific 
meanings can be stabilized, for example in social institutions, all meaning arises from 
a global horizon of possible meanings. Using Luhmann’s (1984) social systems theory 
and Rosen’s (1985) theory of anticipatory systems, I submit algorithms for modeling 
the non-linear dynamics of meaning in social systems. First, a self-referential system 
can use a model of itself for the anticipation. Under the condition of functional 
differentiation, the social system can be expected to entertain a set of models; each 
model can also contain a model of the other models. Two anticipatory mechanisms 
are then possible: a transversal one between the models, and a longitudinal one 
providing the system with a variety of meanings. A system containing two 
anticipatory mechanisms can become hyper-incursive. Without making decisions, 
however, a hyper-incursive system would be overloaded with uncertainty. Under this 
pressure, informed decisions tend to replace the “natural preferences” of agents and a 
knowledge-based order can increasingly be shaped.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The social phenomenon of meaning can be modeled. Meaning can be understood as 
holding current value as well as an anticipation of possible futures. Rosen (1985) 
defined anticipatory systems as systems that contain a model of themselves. The 
modeling part advances on the modeled one and provides meaning to the latter from 
the perspective of hindsight. The time axis of the historical process can thus locally be 
inverted within a system (Dubois, 1998).  
 
The modeling system can also be considered as a semantic domain in which historical 
developments can be appreciated and provided with value. From a biological 
perspective, Maturana (1978) distinguished between a first-order “consensual” 
domain in which organisms interact recursively, and a second-order one “within the 
confines of a consensual domain” in which organisms are additionally able to observe 
one another and provide one another’s actions with interpretations. Such a domain 
would be “indistinguishable from a semantic domain” (Ibid., p. 49). From this 
(biological) perspective, “language” would make it possible to recombine components 
of historically generated consensual behaviour into the generation of new consensual 
behaviour. Meaning would in this case be constituted by the exchange, and a next-
order social system with its own dynamics would be shaped (Maturana, 2000). 
 
Luhmann (1984) built his sociological theory on this next step by considering the 
communication of meaning as the operator of social systems: meaning is the medium 
of social systems and communication the operator. Meaning is selectively used and 
reproduced by communication. Thus, meaning is not merely generated and positioned 
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as in a semantic domain, but can again be communicated using a dynamics which is 
proper to the social system and potentially different from those of individuals (Schutz, 
1932; Berger & Luckman, 1966). The social system not only contains a model of 
itself, but the model can also be entertained within the system, for example, in a 
discourse (Leydesdorff, 2006).1  
 
In biological systems, meaning is processed as wear and tear along the time axis in 
accordance with the “natural” (life-)cycle of the system. In social systems, specific 
meanings can be stabilized, for example in social institutions (Laland et al., 2000), but 
all meaning generated in inter-human communication arises with reference to a global 
horizon of possible meanings (Husserl, 1929). These cultural horizons of meaning can 
also change historically, as Weber noted in 1904: 
 
At one moment or another, the colour will change: the meaning of the perspective 
which was used without reflection will become uncertain; the road seems now to lead 
into zones of twilight. The light of the important problems of culture has gone beyond. 
(…) Science follows the constellations which make it a meaningful enterprise. 
(Weber, 1968, at p. 214). 
 
Whereas this selection between the system and its environment is determined and 
therefore fixed in biological systems (e.g., by assuming natural selection), a non-
linear dynamics of meaning-processing can be generated when this selection 
mechanism is considered as another degree of freedom in the communications 
between the system and its environment. Selections from global horizons of meaning 
                                                 
1 A reflexive individual can learn to handle these distinctions among different kinds of meaning (e.g., 
situational meaning, private meaning, etc.) and thus is able to develop communicative competencies 
(Leydesdorff, 2000). 
 3
add a third (globalizing) selection mechanism to momentary selections from historical 
events in the present and stabilizations of meaning over time.  
 
When three subdynamics operate upon one another, all kinds of chaotic behaviour can 
be generated (Li & Yorke, 1975; May & Leonard, 1975). Thus, the emergence of 
social order can no longer be taken for granted, but needs always to be explained 
(Hobbes, 1651; Luhmann, 1995a). In other words, the social system can be expected 
to evolve as a non-trivial machine because it contains a non-linear dynamics of 
meaning (Baecker, 2002). 
 
Figure 1: Three selections cycle in the case of processing meaning on top of the 
information flow. 
 
The dashed arrow in Figure 1 indicates the resulting dynamics. The cycle may have a 
direction feeding backward or forward on the time axis, since the three selections can 
be expected to operate without a priori coordination. For example, selections in the 
present on the variation operate at the same time as selections from global horizons of 
meaning. However, one can expect that the results of the three subdynamics will be 
different, since selections operate asymmetrically.  
Selection 3 
Selection 2: 
    stabilization over time  
time/ probabilistic 
entropy flow 
meaningful 
information flow Selection 1: 
    from the variation 
    globalization 
 4
 Furthermore, the selections can operate upon each other: some selections can be mad 
for stabilization, while other are selected for globalization. Aelection mechanisms 
may thus co-evolve in a process of “mutual shaping.” A third selection mechanism 
can be expected to disturb such mutual shaping by adding another source of 
uncertainty. In the case of biological systems, this third selection mechanism is 
determined as “natural” selection, and thus would drive the aging of the system. In 
Luhmann’s social systems theory, the globalizing horizons of meaning tend to remain 
unspecified otherwise than with reference to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology 
(e.g., Luhmann, 1995b). 
 
The three selection mechanisms have in common that meaning is provided from the 
perspective of hindsight and can therefore be modeled using incursive equations 
(Dubois, 1998; Leydesdorff, 2005). Incursive equations—to be explained below—
invert the time axis by appreciating the past from the perspective of the present. 
Leydesdorff & Dubois (2004) have shown that the incursive formulation of the 
logistic equation can be used to model interaction and aggregation in inter-human 
communication. Interaction and aggregation can be considered as the building blocks 
of social systems of communication because (1) interaction is recursive (that is, 
interactions can operate on previous interactions), (2) interactive processes can be 
aggregated, and (3) aggregations can interact (Leydesdorff, 2003).  
 
In this paper, I attempt to formulate how these building blocks can be organized into 
the architecture of a social system. How can the cycle of meaning processing—
indicated in Figure 1—be closed as a feedback loop upon the linear movement of the 
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entropy flux? First, I generalize the model—that is, the incursive formulation of the 
logistic equation—for the case of differentiated structures of meaning-processing at 
the supra-individual level. Secondly, I specify a hyper-incursive mechanism of 
anticipation as yet another possibility in a system which contains more than a single 
mechanism for anticipation. The hyper-incursive mechanism interacts with the 
incursive anticipations and makes historical decisions unavoidable. One can expect 
the resulting system to be strongly anticipatory (Dubois, 2000). Unlike weakly 
anticipatory systems—which entertain a model of themselves—strongly anticipatory 
ones cannot provide predictions because these systems use expectations for the 
construction of their future states (Collier, 2005).2
 
2. Incursion  
 
A self-referential system can be considered as a function of itself and its environment. 
Baecker (2002, at p. 86) proposed modeling such a system using the following 
equation:   
 
),( ESfS =        (1) 
 
However, the environment is only relevant for a self-referential system as its carrying 
capacity; the environment sets limits to growth. This specific relation between the 
development of a system and its environment can be modeled using the logistic 
equation as follows (Devaney, 2003):  
 
                                                 
2 Dubois (2003, at p. 114) defined hyper-incursion as an incursion that generates multiple future states. 
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)1(1 ttt xaxx −=+       (2) 
 
The carrying capacity of the selection environment (1 – xt) inhibits further growth of 
the system as a feedback term. For relatively small values of the parameter a (1 < a < 
3), this generates the well-known sigmoid curves of systems which grow and undergo 
transitions. For larger values of a, the model bifurcates into an oscillation (at a ≥ 3) or 
increasingly generates chaos (3.57 < a < 4). 
 
Unlike this biological (e.g., population-dynamic) model which operates with the 
arrow of time pointing forward, meaning is provided in the present with hindsight. 
This can be modeled using the same equation, but with different time parameters as 
follows (Dubois, 1998): 
 
)1( 11 ++ −= ttt xaxx       (3) 
 
In this case, the system builds on its previous state, but the current state provides the 
selection environment. Without any addition, Equation 3 can analytically be 
reorganized into Equation 4 as follows: 
 
)1/(1 ttt xaxx +=+       (4) 
 
This system cannot generate chaotic phenomena because it converges into a stable 
state for all values of the parameter (a). Because incursion provides us with a model 
of a historically developing system, one is able to generate an observer in the 
simulation who reflexively follows the development of the observed system 
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(Leydesdorff, 2005). The challenge, however, remains the construction of an 
observing system which is able to predict developments in the complex system under 
observation (Dubois, 2002). 
 
3. Longitudinal and transversal incursion 
 
All systems which entertain a model of themselves can provide meaning to the 
modeled system with hindsight, that is, by inverting the time axis locally. I shall call 
this the “longitudinal” generation of meaning, which will be distinguished below from 
the “transversal” generation of meaning. Transversal meaning can only be generated 
by systems which stabilize different codes for providing meaning. Thus, these 
systems can be expected to contain more than a single meaning. Furthermore, 
transversally generated meaning can again be provided with longitudinally generated 
meaning: the time axis stands perpendicular to the differentiation. In other words, the 
system spans a multi-dimensional space that develops over time.  
 
Meanings may vary at each moment of time, but differently codified meanings can be 
stabilized only in systems that are functionally differentiated in terms of the codes of 
communication. The functionality of the differentiation means that the system is able 
to use the differentiation among the codes for its reproduction. By using the codes, 
events can then be appreciated differently within the system. Here, Luhmann’s (1984) 
contribution becomes particularly valuable because he argued—following Parsons 
(1951)—that functional differentiation is prevailent in modern societies. He added 
that the differentiation should be considered as a differentiation of the symbolically 
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generalized media of communication, that is, of next-order codification structures 
(Künzler, 1987). 
 
Parsons (1967a and b) introduced “symbolic generalization” to explain the sometimes 
binding character of collective action. His concept remained close to Weber’s concept 
of values, except that the values are not given; symbolic generalization would 
function as a mechanism to integrate the social system despite the structural 
differences within it (caused by functional differentiation). Using money as the model 
of an exchange medium, Parsons (1967a and b) extended this concept to include 
power and influence as other exchange media that can be generalized symbolically.  
 
Luhmann (1975) elaborated on Parsons’s concept by considering power, etc., as codes 
of communication, each of which can be generalized under the condition of functional 
differentiation. In a previous, hierarchical, order the different media were subsumed 
under each other: for example, the Holy Roman Emperor had to go to Canossa 
because the Pope had eventually the power to “excommunicate” him. Under the 
condition of modernity, exchange systems can develop according to their own logic, 
and thus science, politics, the economy, affection, etc., can further develop their 
specific codes of communication along (nearly) orthogonal axes. Symbolic 
generalization implies that every event can be assessed from the specific perspective 
of each code of communication. For example, everything can be assessed in terms of 
its economic value or its esthetic beauty, and these assessments do not have to 
correspond because they are coded differently. 
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Assessments using codes can be considered as events that can be assessed using a 
different perspectives. How do the assessments assess one another using different 
codes? For example, technologies which develop in generations over time have to 
compete for markets in the present. The markets code the technologies in terms of 
prices or price/performance relations, while engineers code the technologies 
according to professional standards. Thus, two codes of communication are operating 
simulataneously: the prices on markets and the professional coding expressed in 
engineering textbooks. The markets select in the present among the technologies 
which are developing over time. This can again be modeled using the incursive 
formulation of the logistic equation (Equation 3 above) because the development of 
the technology contains both a reference to a previous state of this technology (i) and 
a reference to a current state, but in a different subsystem of society (e.g., the market 
j). The corresponding equation can be formulated as follows: 
 
)1( 11
j
t
i
t
i
t xaxx ++ −=       (3) 
 
These transversal selections among subsystems are additional to the longitudinal 
development of meaning at all levels within self-referential systems. Note that the 
longitudinal selection is hierarchical, while the transversal one changes with the 
nature of the differentiation. The two axes stand orthogonally under the condition of 
functional differentiation. In other words, the longitudinal generation of meaning was 
already available as an incursive mechanism in pre-modern societies, while the 
transversal updates provide modern societies with an analytically independent 
mechanism for organizing communications. 
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4. Functional differentiation 
 
Let us return to Equation 1 to understand what functional differentiation means for a 
system that can operate both incursively (that is, against the axis of time) and 
recursively (that is, historically). Adding the time subscripts, one can first reformulate 
Equation 1 for the (more general) recursive case: 
 
),(1 ttt ESfS =+       (5) 
 
When functionality of the differentiation prevails, the external environment E is 
decomposed for each subsystem in other subsystems (with a remaining term ε as a 
representation of the residual environment). This can modeled at the subsystems 
level—let me use the lower-case s for this level—as follows: 
 
),...,,,,(1 t
l
t
k
t
j
t
i
t
i
t ssssfs ε=+      (6) 
 
In a functionally differentiated system, the windowing of the subsystems upon each 
other becomes horizontal. A biological system, however, would remain also 
integrated also for the sake of survival. A communication system can also develop in 
terms of differentiated fluxes that are integrated by being organized historically.  
 
How might functional differentiation in the communication take control over 
development away from the historical organization of a social system? Luhmann 
(1997, 2000) distinguished between the self-organization of the differentiated fluxes 
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of communication and their integration into organizations. The organization of 
interfaces is historical, while the self-organization of the differentiated 
communication operates evolutionarily, that is, by providing meaning to the events 
with hindsight and by using potentially different codes. The social system would thus 
be able to entertain a set of models of itself. In other words, an additional equation can 
be formulated for each subsystem given selections by the others from the perspective 
of hindsight: 
 
),...,,,,( 1111 t
l
t
k
t
j
t
i
t
i
t ssssfs ε++++ =      (7) 
 
Note that all systems and subsystems continue to operate historically, and thus 
provide meaning to their own development along the longitudinal axis at the same 
time as they provide meanings to one another. The relations between subsystems can 
be expected to function to variable degrees both incursively and recursively because 
Equation 6 and Equation 7 are both operational. However, the functionally 
differentiated system contains an additional ∆t at each interface within the system. 
This ∆t can be used for a local reversal of the time axis and thus generate a transversal 
incursion which stands orthogonally to the longitudinal incursions. 
 
The two types of incursion—the transversal and the longitudinal ones—stand 
orthogonally, but they can interact in systems that are able to process meaning. This 
interaction can perhaps be considered as the crucial difference between biological and 
social systems. Differentiated biological systems can hold different meanings, but are 
not supposed to vary them over time for reasons other than natural one (that is, 
survival purposes). The integrity of these systems would be endangered if the codes 
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were varied, that is, by entertaining them playfully. Social systems, however, allow 
for this type of (potentially innovative!) processing and recombination of meanings. 
Interactions among differently codified meanings over time provide us with other 
combinations in a horizon of possible meanings. 
 
Using the logistic equation, one can formulate Equation 7 for the case where other 
subsystems provide relevant environments for the development of subsystem i, as 
follows: 
 
ε)...1)(1)(1( 1111 ltktjtitit xxxaxx ++++ −−−=    (8) 
 
Each subsystem (i) develops with reference to its own previous state, but one can 
expect that all other subsystems feedback upon this development by entertaining a 
model of the reference system in the present using their respective codes. Since each 
meaning-providing subsystem (i) also provides meaning to its own development 
longitudinally, and the two types of meaning-providing can interact, one can 
generalize Equation 8 as follows: 
 
ε.)1(
1
11 ∏ ++ −= n ntitit xaxx      (9) 
 
In this formula n represents the number of subsystems of the functionally 
differentiated system. While this number was analytically restricted in Parsons’s 
structural-functionalism—using his so-called four-function paradigm—the number of 
subsystems can vary in Luhmann’s (1997) theory with the historical development of 
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the media of communication and their symbolic generalization into codes. When the 
subsystems use different frequencies for their updates, parameters have to be added to 
the corresponding selection mechanisms. 
 
5. Stabilization, Meta-stabilization, and Globalization  
 
Let us now turn to the question of what one can expect when one type of meaning 
operates upon a differently codified meaning at one or more interfaces. I mentioned 
above that the operation of two differently codified incursions upon each other may 
lead to “mutual shaping” and the consequent stabilization of a co-evolution along a 
trajectory. The formalization will enable us to distinguish between stabilization in a 
co-evolution between two subdynamics and the possibility of globalization in the case 
of three subdynamics. 
 
When selection is represented by the feedback term of the logistic equation, that is, by 
(1 – x), two selections of the same system operating on a variation a would result at 
the systems level in a quadratic expression of the following form: 
 
 f(x)   = a (1 – x) ( 1 – x)  
  = a (x2 – 2x + 1)      (10)   
 
This function is represented by the solid line in Figure 2a (on the left side): a system 
with two selections can be stabilized at the minimum of a quadratic curve. When this 
minimum is extended along the time dimension, a valley is shaped in which the 
system can follow a trajectory (Sahal, 1985; Waddington, 1957).  
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Figure 2a:  
f(x) = x2 – 2x + 1 (stabilized)  
f(x) = x3 – 3x2 + 3x – 1 (globalized) 
Figure 2b: Globalization and stabilization 
are no longer harmonized; a local optimum 
can be sustained temporarily.  
 
 
Adding one more selection term leads analogously to the following equation: 
 
   f(x)  = a (1 – x) (1 – x) (1 – x)  
= – a (x3 – 3x2 + 3x – 1)     (11) 
 
This latter function is represented as the dotted line in Figure 2a. As long as the 
selections operate with the same parameters, the global and the stable points of 
inflection coincide (in a so-called “saddle point”). The historically stabilized system 
can then be identical with the global one. Perhaps such a harmonized system can be 
said to have an identity, since the global optimum coincides with the localized one. 
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Figure 2b shows the resulting configuration when stabilization and globalization no 
longer operate with the same parameter values. In this (more general) case, one would 
expect the curve to show both a maximum and a minimum. At the minimum the 
system is stabilized, but at the maximum it can be considered as meta-stable. A 
bifurcation is thus induced because the system can go backward (to the stabilization 
of an identity) or forward (to globalization into a next-order regime). As long as the 
system remains stable (that is, at the minimum), it can develop along a trajectory. 
However, the flux tends to move the system towards the other basin of attraction. This 
attraction is caused by the possibility to communicate in an additional dimension, and 
thus to process more complexity in the newly emerging configuration (Turing, 1942). 
 
The sign of the equations merits further attention. Equation 10 has a positive sign if 
one assumes the logistic equation as the basic format for the selection. If this sign is 
reversed, another subdynamic has to play a role because this inversion cannot be 
endogenous to the mutual selections that co-evolutionarily stabilized the system. The 
third (sub)dynamic may either reinforce the prevailing equilibrium and make the 
system hyper-stable, or invert the sign and make the system meta-stable (Figure 3). 
Thus, both meta-stability and hyper-stability indicate that a third subdynamic is 
operating (but not yet necessarily manifest).  
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Figure 3a: Meta-stabiliziation Figure 3b: Hyper-stabilization 
 
For example, the change in the sign can be appreciated as a market with decreasing 
marginal returns versus one with increasing marginal returns, as in the case of 
information and communication technologies (Arthur, 1988, 1989). Increasing 
marginal returns can lead to a bifurcation at the meta-stable vertex of the hyperbole 
and a consequential lock-in on either side. In the case of a lock-in, the previously 
meta-stable system is hyper-stabilized by using the third term as a feedback which 
reinforces the co-evolution between the two other subdynamics (Leydesdorff & 
Meyer, forthcoming). 
 
Figure 2b above provided the full picture with both a positive and a negative 
inflection point in the case of three interacting subdynamics. Stabilization can be 
considered as a result of integration (e.g., by organization), while differentiation 
among the self-organizing fluxes can be expected to prevail when the system is less 
organized. However, the distinction between these two subdynamics—integration and 
differentiation—remains analytical; in the social system they can be expected to 
concur, since the global system cannot be historically manifest without some form of 
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stabilization occurring at the same time. The interactions between the various 
subdynamics make the system complex and result in the expectation of continuous 
transitions between provisional (that is, local) stabilizations versus globalizations at 
the systems level. How would these subdynamics of stabilization and globalization 
operate in the case of a meaning-processing system?  
 
6. Hyper-incursion 
 
The historical realization of meaningful information by the first incursion at each 
moment (Selection 1 in Figure 1) remains a necessary condition for the development 
of the social system, but this operation does not have to be attended by the other two 
selection mechanisms continuously. The other two selection mechanisms can also be 
expected to interact. A third incursive mechanism can interact with the interaction 
term between two incursive selections, and this can generate a next-order selection or 
hyper-incursivity. A hyper-incursive equation no longer refers necessarily to a 
historical realization because it can interact with the interaction term between the two 
anticipatory mechanisms which refer to the new state.  
 
The most radical of the hyper-incursive equations reflects this orientation to the future 
as follows:  
 
 xt = axt+1 (1 – xt+1)       (12) 
 
This system no longer contains any reference to its previous state xt-1 or its current 
state xt (at t = t), but the emerging state is considered as a function of different 
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expectations about the future. Note that both expectations interfaced in this equation 
can only be based on previous incursions (Figure 4). When incursions are interfaced 
recursively, only a historical variation can be produced (Leydesdorff, in print). 
However, when the two incursions are interfaced incursively, hyper-incursion can also 
be expected.  
Selection 3: 
 
F
Incursion 1 as selection on the variation at each moment of time, and Incursion
stabilization with reference to change over time. 
 
igure 4: Hyper-incursivity at the interface between two incursive selections: 
 2 as 
While each incursion generates meaningful information and thus becomes organized 
both historically (with reference to t = t) and reflexively (with reference to t = (t + 1)), 
hyper-incursion is by itself not yet organized at t = t because it contains only a 
reference to t = (t + 1). An additional subdynamic, therefore, would be needed in 
order to make the results of this hyper-incursion again organized in historical time. 
Luhmann (2000) hypothesized that self-organization among the (differently coded) 
fluxes of communication—which generate only expectations—is brought under 
organizational control by making decisions. Let us first see how this works in terms of 
the equations. 
 
Incursion 2 
referential to t + 1 
Incursion 1 
referential to t = t + 1 Incursion 2 
referential to t = t  
Hyper-incursion with two references to t = t + 1 
Incursion 1 
referential to t = t 
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Equation 12 can be rewritten as follows: 
xt = axt+1 (1 – xt+1)       (12) 
 
      (13) 
or a = 4, xt+1 is defined as a function of xt as follows: 
xt+1 = ½ ± ½ √ (1 – xt)       (14) 
epending on the plus or the minus sign in the equation, two future states are 
e states 
ubois (2003, at p. 115) specified a decision function u(t) that can be added for 
u(t) = 2 d(t) – 1      (15) 
 
here u = +1 for the decision d = 1 (true) and u = –1 for the decision d = 0 (false). In 
 
xt = axt+1 – axt+12         
 axt+12 – axt+1 + xt = 0 
 xt+12 – xt+1 + (xt /a) = 0
 
F
 
 
 
D
generated at each time step. Since this formula is iterative, the number of futur
doubles with each next time step. After N time steps, 2N future states would be 
possible. (For N = 10, the number of options is already more than a thousand.)  
 
D
making a choice between two options: 
 
w
a social system, however, more choices than these two extremes are possible. Social 
systems operate in a distributed mode, and therefore one would expect a probability 
distribution of preferences. This distribution contains an uncertainty. In distributed 
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systems, decisions can be organized and codified into decision rules (Bertsekas & 
Tsitsiklis, 1989).  
 
Note that the decisions or decision rules do not determine the hyper-incursive 
 
r-
 
 
he horizon of possible meanings itself could not be further developed historically 
 
istorical 
x 
 other words, decisions specify instantiations among the available options when 
anticipations are interfaced. The organization of decisions along a historical axis 
dynamics of the system, but only guide these dynamics historically. (A codified
decision rule could function as yet another incursive mechanism.) However, hype
incursion continues to create possible futures as interactions among expectations on
the basis of incursive subdynamics. Decisions change the historical conditions by 
organizing the system, that is, by closing the circle in Figure 1. However, decisions
don’t have to be taken at each step. Without historicity, the interfacing of expectations 
would remain in the virtual realm of fantasy and speculation.  
 
T
without any social realizations. The relevant decisions, however, are no longer taken
about historical facts, but about expectations. Thanks to this orientation towards the 
future, the social system can become increasingly knowledge-based because 
anticipations are continuously being fed into its historical development. The h
realizations result increasingly from the interfacing of expectations as a base other 
than—but in interaction with—the historical organization of “reality” (Equation 6). 
The cycling among the selections adds meaningful information to the information flu
which develops with the time axis. By bending the time-axis, the meaning-generating 
system increasingly reconstructs its own history (Hellsten et al., 2006). 
 
In
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potentially stabilizes a trajectory within the phase space of expectations. Social ord
is made contingent on coupling expectations about other possible realities with th
historical reality of observable actions and institutions. The latter are increasingly 
reconstructed as the results of interactions among expectations.  
 
Historically, one may be inclined to consider actions and instituti
er 
e 
ons as the causes of 
xpectations because the former precede the latter. However, anticipations are based 
 
hile the 
 
ed in the 
tion in social systems 
rom the logistic equation:  
e
on the perspective of hindsight, while the latter becomes analytically prior to the 
historical sequence of events if the time axis is locally inverted. When the feedback is
codified and the codification reinforced by global horizons of meaning, the 
reconstructive arrow (from the perspective of hindsight) can in the longer term 
become more important than the forward arrow of historical development. W
historical construction continues to feed into the cycle bottom-up, control in 
communication systems thus tends to become top-down when the cycle can be closed
and reinforced as a next-order dynamics. Unlike “natural” preferences ground
historical direction of the time axis, informed decisions guide development into an 
increasingly knowledge-based order given the contingencies of historical situations as 
relevant contexts. 
 
7. Mutual anticipa
 
Two other hyper-incursive models follow f
 
)1( 1+−= ttt xaxx        (16) 
 )1(1 ttt xaxx −= +        (17) 
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• Equation 16 evolves into x = (a – 1)/a = Constant. I submit that this evolution 
towards a constant through anticipation can be considered as modeling the self-
reference or the expectation of an (individual) identity. Identity is based on the 
expectation of continuity of the “self” in the next stage. At the level of the social 
system a group can also be expected to have an identity; 
• Equation 17 evolves into xt+1 = (1/a) {xt / (1 – xt)}. Since the latter term 
approaches –1 as its limit value and the former term is a constant (1/a), this 
representation can alternate between itself and a mirror image. This subdynamic 
thus formalizes the reflexive operation.  
 
In other words, the three hyper-incursive equations specify the fundamental processes 
of meaning-processing: identity formation (Eq. 16), reflexivity (Eq. 17), and the 
mutual expectation of expectations (Eq. 13). While identity and reflexivity are more 
commonly defined in social theory, the expectation of expectations among systems 
may require additional explanation. Let me develop this as an analogon of the concept 
of “double contingency,” but at the level of differently coded subsystems of society.  
 
“Double contingency” was theorized in sociology as an interaction between Ego and 
Alter (Parsons, 1968). Ego and Alter are used in order to emphasize that in the relation 
between two human beings, the Ego knows the Alter to be a reflexive Cogito who 
entertains expectations. Thus, a social reality is constructed in which a symbolic order 
is invoked (Lévy-Strauss, 1987; Elmer, 1995). For the Ego this means that one’s own 
reflexivity is reinforced in the encounter. The Ego in the present (xt) no longer has a 
reference to itself other than in a future state (x ), that is, as an Alter Ego. The t+1
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orientation of providing meaning with reference to other possible meanings thus 
constitutes the social world as an order different from psychological ones (Husse
1929; Schutz, 1932).  
 
Habermas (1987) critic
rl, 
ized Luhmann’s social systems theory for having replaced the 
aditional subject of transcendental philosophy (that is, the Ego) with the concept of a 
gle 
.  
ntertain and develop expectations which contain references to other possible 
n 
ons 
 
stems contain a reference to themselves as an identity (Equation 16). (Individuals 
l 
tr
social system. Let me use this critique as a heuristics for understanding meaning-
processing in a social system. Unlike the multitude of subjects—who can entertain 
relations and experience double contingency in these relations—there is only a sin
social system. This system can contain Luhmann-type subsystems at each moment 
and Rosen-type models of itself over time. One can expect differently codified 
subsystems of communication only under the condition of functional differentiation
 
These different subsystems interact in historical organizations, but additionally they 
e
expectations. Given this feedback, the reference of an organization to the time horizo
may evolve from developing within history to developing in terms of expectati
about the future, and thus to being increasingly knowledge-based. Note that the 
phenotypical organizations remain a mixture of the two principles of organization, 
since both Equations 6 and 7 can be expected to operate, albeit with variable weights.
 
Unlike the self-organizing fluxes of communication in social systems, organized 
sy
can then be considered as the smallest units which organize the fluxes.) The socia
order of expectations remains structurally coupled to historical formats of 
 24
organization because the systems dynamics cannot otherwise become historical. Th
self-organization of fluxes in terms of functional differentiations is not itse
historically observable, but only perceptible after a reflexive turn (Husserl, 1929; 
Luhmann, 1984). The coupling between the social system of communications
agents carrying it is provided by the reflexivity formalized in Equation 17. Becaus
this reflexivity, the social system can be entertained by individuals as a notional order, 
that is, an order with the epistemological status of a hypothesis.  
 
Vice versa, the individuals and institutional agents are reflected in
e 
lf 
 and the 
e of 
 the social system as 
ddresses or nodes. Since both systems can be expected to contain the reflexive 
e 
 
e social system so that a double 
ontingency between functionally differentiated (that is, differently coded) 
s are 
nized. 
a
operation expressed in Equation 17, a coevolution (“mutual shaping”) can also take 
place between the social system and individuals. However, this coevolution can b
interrupted when expectations are further codified (e.g., stabilized) on either side 
beyond the control of the other side. On the side of social systems, an eigendynamics 
of codifications may lead to “alienation” (Platt & Weinstein, 1971). On the side of
individuals, the recursive application of the reflexive operation provides discretionary 
room for private thinking and tacit knowledge.  
 
In summary, functional differentiation changes th
c
subsystems of communication becomes possible. Each of the subsystems can be 
expected to generate its own set of expectations. As these sets of expectation
made relevant to one another, their identity is no longer given, but has to be orga
Organization means in this case limiting the range of options by making decisions 
about the relevant expectations. For example, in the case of innovation one combines 
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market perspectives with technological options. From this perspective, the individu
(e.g., the entrepreneur) can be considered as the minimal carrier of decisions because 
decision-making itself can also be a social process. As was shown, this process guides
the self-organizing dynamics by organizing it, since the complexity would otherwise 
explode. In technical terms, development would rapidly become non-computable 
because it would be non-polynomially (NP) complete (Equation 14). 
 
8. Conclusions 
al 
 
rential systems, social systems can generate meaning in an incursive 
ode and thus be anticipatory, that is, by entertaining expectations along the axis of 
systems. 
c levels 
 
s can be recombined with 
e longitudinal generation of meaning and thus provide a field of possible meanings. 
 
Like all self-refe
m
time. The functional differentiation of society in terms of different codes of 
communication provides the social system with an additional mechanism of 
anticipation because of asynchronicity in the updates among the different sub
In organized systems and hierarchies, these transversal updates at subsystemi
are synchronized at the top with reference to an external environment, but a 
functionally differentiated system has replaced this option for survival by considering
the subsystems as relevant environments for one another.  
 
The transversal generation of meaning among the subsystem
th
This second-order incursion upon the anticipatory terms of the first-order incursions 
provided us with the hyper-incursive equation which models a third selection 
mechanism. The uncertainty generated by this model, however, forces the system to 
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be organized periodically like an update mechanism. I submitted that the minimum 
unit for this historicity is the individual.  
 
At the level of individual interactions, hyper-incursivity is also available as a “double 
bsystems 
he social system shares with psychological systems the other two hyper-incursive 
 is 
tion of 
hus, a hypercycle between three selection mechanims of meaning can be shaped at 
contingency”: the meeting of the other as entertaining a similar, but potentially 
different set of expectations. “Double contingency” can thus be considered as a 
transversal encounter between different sets of meanings, but in the case of 
individuals whole systems (agents) meet and update, and not subsystems. Su
of communication operate at a different level, and they can only reproduce a double 
contingency towards one another if the functional differentiation between them is 
warranted in terms of codes developing along different axes. 
 
T
operations (identity formation and reflexivity). Unlike individuals, the social system
able to generate within the system a non-linear dynamic among three selection 
mechanisms: (1) selections from a variety of global horizons of meaning, (2) 
historical realizations in organizations at each moment, and (3) the transforma
the latter by the need to recombine expectations based on previous realizations over 
time. Individuals can meet and experience a double contingency in the relation 
between Alter and Ego, but by doing so they already constitute a social system 
(Leydesdorff, 2003; Leydesdorff & Dubois, 2004). 
 
T
the level of the social system. The three selections operate as in a triple helix: when 
the configuration allows for interaction of a third selection mechanism with the 
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interaction between two other selections, hyper-incursion becomes a possibility, 
when this occurs the systems can be expected to avalanche towards the strongly 
anticipatory regime of a knowledge-based society. In a knowledge-based order, 
decisions can increasingly be informed by expectations. 
 
and 
et me finally note that the argument in this paper would indicate that the social 
stage 
is 
e 
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